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AND FOR THE STUDENT? THE SEVEN
STRIKING STRENGTHS OF "BALLOTS,
BUCKS, MAPS & THE LAW"
Roy A. Schotland*
There's no free lunch at the curriculum table: each course has
strengths and weaknesses, every coin has two sides, but this course's
strengths are unusual enough to merit focus. I leave it to others to
explore the weaknesses and so help us improve on those.' Whether
or not one teacher's focus converts any new believers, it may stir
useful exchange among people already doing this course. I emphasize what this course offers students.
I.

A CHALLENGE TO PRECONCEPTIONS AND POLARITIES

A. A Preconceptionthat Goes Beyond Election Law: On Law and
Ethnic Differences
In most courses, many students begin with few preconceptions,
let alone feelings. For example, in Administrative Law, some students may be anti-regulation or pro-consumer, but few will have
strong feelings. In Criminal Law, many students start with significant pro- or anti-police attitudes. In Election Law, as in any course
that deals with legislation regarding ethnic issues, many students
start out with firm positions on whether the Constitution is "colorblind." Few concrete encounters with that question are as potent for
exploring how the government approaches and should approach

* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. I note only one weakness: the course's tendency to bring out partisan
and similar biases. The value of openness probably makes that a strength
when it comes to the student, but possible bias wants full attention when it
comes to the teacher or casebook editor.
1227
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racial differences as the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") 2 and the judiciary's annual contests over it.
Election Law provides an opportunity to re-examine what one
means by "affirmative action." Districting is not like the simple polarity of some people being favored over others, as in for example,
employment selection or college admission. Rather, districting involves complex polycentricity. The issue becomes whether some
district lines may be drawn to create a majority of people from one or
more ethnic minorities, or whether ethnicity is the one characteristic
that must be segregated away from the varied array of districting
factors, such as community of interest and partisanship. Unlike the
color-blind selection of individuals for a limited number of jobs,
where for each winner there is a loser, most districts likely include
some voters who differ from their "neighbors" in ways that make
them a relatively distinct minority.
The VRA's history is clear. Few if any students are surprised by
the history that led to the VRA. Many, however, are surprised by the
post-1965 history of efforts to evade the VRA, such as the number of
jurisdictions that moved from single-member to at-large districts or
from elective to appointive offices. In addition, a number of districts
employed a panoply of obstacles to the VRA. These obstacles, exposed in the 1981 hearings on re-enacting the VRA, so outraged
Henry Hyde that his committee approved strengthening, not only reenacting, by a vote of twenty-five to one. 3 Perhaps these recent
events are surprising because even after the VRA was passed, fueled
by such strong national consensus, there was widespread resistance
although the resisters had to realize that their efforts could succeed
for at most only brief periods. This relatively recent history tests the
view that today racism is behind us. Revealingly, some students who
are unsympathetic to VRA districting have a hard time keeping in
mind that a section 24 suit cannot be successful without proof of the
denial of equal opportunity. The history and continuing evidence of

2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
3. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, GIANT KILLERS 159, 162, 179 (1986).
4. See Voting Rights Act § 2, 79 Stat. at 437 (prohibiting the abridgment
of voting rights by reason of race and color).
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discrimination provide unforgettable examples 5of the ways in which
those who had power used the law to sustain it.
Whether one prefers color-blind law or instead believes that that
preference is sheer blindness, one confronts the fact that with our
"rainbow" population, VRA battles are often not as initially imagined-between better-off whites and poorer blacks. Rather, these
battles are often between blacks and Hispanics, or between poor
whites and poor blacks, or between Caribbean blacks and other
blacks. In addition, even within a cohesive ethnic group there may
be sharp differences on which remedy will be more fruitful for them.
to create one majorityThe differences turn on, for example, whether
6
districts.
"influence"
minority district or two
Another shift from polarity to complexity is that some minority
advocates attack the great increase in minority representation that the
VRA has produced and deem it insufficient change. That same increase, however, is under attack by various other groups as actually
reducing minority power by isolating minority representatives.
One last value in examining districting is that the problem of
drawing district lines forces students from the happy array of abstract
criteria to Sophie's Choice-type ranking. We begin with the familiar
5. Sympathizing with an oppressed minority does not require being smug
about the majorities who fight to protect their positions. No one should dismiss the resistance to the VRA as simple racism. A major message from this
course is that all majorities, not merely racial majorities, have an understandable preference for the status quo.
A leading Mississippi segregationist described his resistance in a way
that I believe anyone anywhere in the nation might use to describe their defense of their own status quo:
I was born in Mississippi and the United States and I'm the product of
my heredity and education and the society in which I was raised, and I
have a vested interest in that society, and I along with a million other
white Mississippians will do everything in our power to protect that
vested interest. It's just as simple as that .... It's primarily a struggle
for power and I think we would be stupid indeed if we failed to see
where the consequences of a supine surrender on our part would lead.
FRANK PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT 6 (1990) (quoting a speech by William

J. Simmons, head of the Citizens Council, an all-white segregationist group).
6. For an outstandingly luminous account of the struggles in Georgia before and after Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), see Robert A. Holmes,
Reapportionment Strategies in the 1990s: The Case of Georgia, in RACE AND
REDISTRICTING INTHE 1990S 191 (Bernard Grofman ed. 1998).

1230

LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 32:1227

exaltation of contiguity and compactness, and of all feasible adherences to political lines, geographic regions and communities of interest, and the political interests of either protecting incumbents or
promoting competitiveness. The usual examination of the realities
about these major criteria follows. When we try, however, to draw
district lines for a hypothetical jurisdiction, we encounter acute competition, even conflict, among the criteria. This competition highlights that choice is inescapable, a loud and clear lesson that there is
no free lunch and a fine posing of the oldest question of governance:
who shall choose? That leads directly to the question of what should
be the process for making these choices, as noted below.
B. PreconceptionsAbout Aspects ofElection Law: Campaign
Finance
Campaign finance provides a rare instance of the need to move
from myths to realities. Campaign finance is a subject on which
many students have strong views, even feelings, like much of the
public but naturally more intense. A few years ago, the dominant
myth was that political action committees ("PACs") have inordinate
power and that it would be a good thing to abolish them or restrict
them. The value for the student is far less in looking at whether
abolishing them would be constitutional-though, of course, we do
look-than in taking two non-legal steps. First, Sargent Friday's
step: get the facts. 7 For example, just roughly, how many PACs
give how much money? How would you answer that question?
Would you be surprised to learn that the proportion of PACs-the
total number is over 4,000-that give nothing at all is thirty-five percent? That the proportion giving $1-$5,000 is another twenty percent? That those PACs which gave between $250,001-$500,000 total two percent, or from $500,001-$1,000,000 total one percent, or
over $1,000,000 another one percent? 8 The second question: do you
7. Unless one believes that one can study the law of politics without relevant facts, the two splendid casebooks on Election Law desperately need a
supplement presenting at least campaign finance data. My own supplement is
available to anyone who, like me, finds existing data sources both too voluminous and, understandably, lacking in focus on aspects pertinent for the course,
such as independent spending or in-state sources versus out-state sources. The
data should cover at least a decade and be updated every two years.
8. See FEC data for 1997-1998 through Nov. 13, 1998, published in
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consider PACs like Emily's List, or PACs that promote or oppose
gun control, or promote or oppose abortion rights, or oppose or support the rights of immigrants, undesirable? Or are such PACs instead
exemplary exercises of the freedom of association? There is always
value in advancing thinking from lumpy, abstract aggregates like
"PACs are bad" to concrete distinctions like "grass-root PACs call
for a different approach."
In the past few elections, paranoia about PACs has faded and the
dominant evils have become "soft money" and "issue ads." Regarding soft money, relatively little value lies in asking why it is undesirable to fund voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. Nor
do we deal much with whether banning soft money would be constitutional. Rather, the illuminating query is asking how a ban would
work. If the national party committees were barred from raising soft
money, how many days would pass before there would be a new
Washington office for each party's "coalition of state parties," which
would raise soft money directly instead of through the national party
committees? 9
If soft money is to be stopped, the reality of our federalism calls
for one of two steps. One possible step would require that state elections be subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act'0 if those
elections are held at the same time as federal elections. Any constitutional question regarding that approach is moot because it would
give state and local office-holders a risk-free opportunity to run
against the Members and so Congress will never try that route. The
obvious alternative step, to follow Connecticut's lead, is to have
states bar any funds that do not comply with local law for state and
local elections. Assume, for working purposes that most states take
COMMrITEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN THE PEOPLE'S

BUSINESS: A BUsINESS PROPOSAL FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 16

(1999). Having watched these data for a decade, I know that the proportions
have changed very little, in 1987-88 they were, respectively 32%, 27%, 1.5%,
0.52% and 0.48% (Source: FEC).
9. The proposal to ban soft money by limiting the national party committees is not merely a hypothetical easy to mock. It is exactly the terms of a
March 1999 reform proposal, one drawing editorial praise, made by the Committee for Economic Development. See id. at 34; Editorial, Stirrings on CampaignFinance,WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1999, at A28.

10. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
[hereinafter FECA].
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that step and stop all soft money from flowing to parties. This would
stop neither "issue ads" by non-party groups nor independent
spending of "hard money." At this point, we reach the cutting-edge
of current reform proposals: impose various limits on all electionrelated advertising during, for example, the sixty days before the
election. It is too early for any consensus on the wisdom and constitutionality of such proposals." But the point for this essay is how
far the student has moved from the simplicity of "stop that evil" to
the reality of how fluid are campaign funds, and how likely it is,
given past experience, that new bans will mean new flows around the
bans.
C. Summing Up the Course'sChallenge to Preconceptions
The election law course is not unique, probably not even unusual, in taking students from a preconception that there are fairly
clear problems for which fairly clear solutions are available, to a realization that the problems are complex and the solutions not obvious
or they would already be in place.
II. A CHALLENGE TO CYNICISM
Few domains of legal regulation have been as problematic as
12
campaign finance regulation, a major segment of this course.
Many students come into Election Law believing that "what everybody does" includes illegal conduct. Many other students, who start
with a rosy faith that we can reasonably and easily regulate "what
everybody does," may abandon hope as they run into the realities of
the situation. For example, a recent law journal symposium about
11. How, if political speech is at the core of the First Amendment, can one
ban genuinely independent grass-roots groups from public advocacy for their
concerns at the very times that matter most, and in ways they believe effective?
A separate, tougher question is raised by the proposal requiring disclosure of
the major sources funding such advocacy.

12. As noted in other articlesin this symposium, our course is blessed with
two fine casebooks. I have learned invaluably from SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET
AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (1998), and its newly available information and
exceptional analyses. But I continue to use the impressively solid DANIEL
LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAw (1995), our subject's pioneer book, because it

treats campaign finance as one of the most critical current issues in "The Law
of Democracy," one of particular interest to and value for students.
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campaign finance reform was entitled "Will Anything Work?"' 3
How far we have come from
Watergate and what Bayless Manning
14
potlatch."'
"purity
called the
Consider just one of the reasons for our fall from faith, or rise to
wisdom, since a generation ago: So many of us-including myself-were naive enough to believe that, for example, having an independent commission would be a crucial step forward to assure enforcement of whatever regulation 15 was enacted. We so totally
underestimated that if the statute is written by the likes of Wayne
Hayes, 16 the commission would have a unique structure. Common
Cause described this structure most memorably in an early study entitled: "Stalled from the Start."' 17 The Federal Election Commission
("FEC") does not merely have special closeness to Congress-that
13. Symposium, CampaignFinance Reform: Will Anything Work?, 6 J. L.
& POL'Y 1 (1997).
14. Or as Theodore Roosevelt put it in commenting on the 1907 financial

panic: "[T]hey have passed thru the period of unreasoning trust and optimism
into unreasoning distrust and pessimism." Jean Strouse, The BrilliantBailout,
THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 1998, at 62, 75.

15. The word "regulation," for me and many people as old as I, is not
automatically a bad word, indeed, it has many favorable connotations of protecting the public interest and promoting general welfare. I used to call my
course "Election and Campaign Finance Regulation." A few years ago I was
surprised, though I should not have been, when a student who was one of that
year's most engaged class participants came to me to say "this course has a
lousy title." The course is now titled "Ballots, Bucks, Maps & the Law."
16. Wayne Hayes was the Chairman of the House Administration Committee, from 1971 to 1976, and far from a civics-class model legislator in either
policy or his use of power. He might still be in Congress if he had not hired a
typist whose only reason for being hired had nothing to do with her typing.
17. See COMMON CAUSE, STALLED FROM THE START: A COMMON CAUSE
STUDY OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (1981). The Federal Election

Commission is one of only two federal agencies with an even number of commissioners; but unlike the other one, the International Trade Commission, the
FEC cannot take any action without majority approval. Going from law to experience, FEC commissioners have almost always been appointed in pairs, one
from each party. To that extent, Congress has retained-or perhaps even increased-the substance of its power over appointments despite Buckley's having stricken Congress's original formal power to appoint four of the six commissioners. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-43 (1976). Last, almost all
FEC commissioners have enjoyed a consistency of reappointment that is simply unique. The record-holders were the commissioners who left in 1998, one
having been appointed to the original commission in 1975, the other having
served since 1978.
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closeness means the FEC has special concern about incumbents' interests.18

The first reaction to discovering that the enforcement agency is
as it is may be simple cynicism----"the system is loaded." But any
such reaction fades as we explore the implications.
First, given that all legislators have an interest in the regulation
of their campaigns that differs dramatically from their interest in, for
example, securities regulation or zoning regulation, what can be done
to secure effective enforcement? If we move from the federal scene
to the state or local scene-for example, California's Fair Political
Practices Commission or New York City's Campaign Finance
Board-can we find steps that might be adopted at the federal level?
To what extent do we find that more than legal steps are needed?
For example, in a city, a regulatory body may be visible to the voters
and likely to have members of such local repute that they bring an
independence not easily provided by law. 19 Perhaps the difficulties

18. As I write, concern regarding incumbent's interests is exemplified with
rare clarity by a recent FEC ruling. In February 1999, the FEC ruled that a
challenger cannot use any of her or his campaign funds for a personal salary, as
that would be a prohibited "personal use." See FEC Strikes a Blow Against
Challengers Who Need Money to Pay Living Costs, 20 POL. FIN. & LOBBY
REP. 5 (Mar. 10, 1999). The Commission had previously deadlocked on this
issue in 1992, in the face of a staff position that this use could be distinguished
from general "personal use." This year, one new Republican Commissioner
joined three Democratic Commissioners to form a majority. Dissenting veteran Commissioner Lee Ann Elliott wrote that the ruling left self-employed
challengers at an unfair disadvantage and that any abuses could be protected
against by limiting the amount of the salary to the level of pay that members of
Congress enjoy. New Commissioner David Mason joined Elliot dissenting and
wrote that the ruling was probably unconstitutional. Is there not sufficient reason to believe that any challenger's abusive self-compensation from campaign
funds during the campaign would be taken care of by accountability to the
contributors and the voters? Although that safeguard has its own limits, do
they outweigh the protection this ruling gives to incumbents?
19. At least one strain of American political culture is deeply rooted in
Madisonian skepticism about mechanisms that rely heavily on personal virtue; as a consequence, many Americans seem easily persuaded by the argument that truly neutral commissioners are hard to
find or that the potential for abuse in systems that strive for impartiality is unacceptable.
DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE E. CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 146-47

(1992).
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of assuring independent regulators mean that our aspirations for what
can be done at the federal level should differ from what can be done
at the state or local level.
Second, given the legislators' special interest in campaign finance regulation, as we move from the structure of the enforcement
agency to the substance of the statute that the agency implements,
must we not stay alert for incumbent-protective provisions? Only incumbents can write laws. Perhaps this means that forms of regulation which are simple-like disclosure-and, thus, clearly visible for
public accountability, need less scrutiny than forms of regulation
which involve more complex judgments, like setting the level of a
spending limit.
Finally, the legislators' special interest in campaign finance
regulation is only one instance of their special interest in election
regulation generally. When we explore, for example, ballot access
regulation, we find similar tendencies to protect incumbents or their
parties. One might infer that cynicism or defeatism about campaign
finance regulation is unduly narrow; the flaws are inherent in all
election regulation. On the other hand, one might reach new respect
for the limits of law in regulating politics, and new-awareness of the
importance of doing as much as possible-definitely including legal
regulation-to keep the political process open so that it "regulates"
itself.
No one can deny the progress that has been made in campaign
finance disclosure. Our first federal campaign finance disclosure requirements were enacted in 1910 in response to one of the great furors of the muckraking era.20 That first statute, however, was such a
sham that public pressure produced amendments only one year later.
Despite these amendments, the statute remained such a sham that in
1981, the then-chairman of the FEC gave this woeful picture about
the old law:
I was a personal witness to [the] lack of enforcement [before the 1971 enactment of FECA]. In the '60s I served as
chief counsel for the [House] Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures. Every two years I would take
a leave from my law firm in Boston and devote three
20. A few states had effective disclosure requirements even earlier.
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There
months to the work of that special committee ....
were numerous cases where candidates spent hundreds of
thousands of dollars, and [due to loopholes in the law] the
reports filed would indicate expenditures of only a couple
of thousand dollars. 2 '
Disclosure is less forceful legal intervention than many people
want or than we need. But recognizing its limits must not obscure
how potent it is and how much public support it has. Just before the
end of the 1996 presidential campaign, some misguided, hyperlegalistic souls at the Democratic National Committee announced
that they were not required to file the last pre-election disclosure report. Only one or two days of front-page coverage of that decision
led to its reversal. Many observers believe that in the last days of the
1996 campaign, Clinton and therefore down-ballot Democrats lost
substantial support because of disclosures about contributions from
allegedly foreign sources. Disclosure is not thought of as dynamite,
but it works like dynamite to open the political process to public accountability.
However, settling for disclosure alone is defeatism and a declaration of despair. Surely our imagination and our nation's resources 22 can find ways to go beyond disclosure and address such
fundamental flaws in our campaign finance system as the huge,
ever-growing "incumbent-challenger gap"--the fact that so few
challengers have enough funds to be viable candidates, let alone to
21. HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & BRIAN A. HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: AFTER A DECADE OF POLITICAL REFORM 19
(Joyce J.Bartell ed., 1981) (quoting former FEC Chairman John W. McGarry).
Aspects of the sham included that the disclosure requirements did not cover
primaries, runoffs, or intrastate political committees. See id. at 15.
22. One of the best ways of putting these costs in perspective is given in
1989 testimony in the California Assembly:
Most important [of all], therie must be public funding of campaigns. It
is illogical to argue that taxpayer money should not be spent on campaigns. The $79 billion now being spent [by California that year]
translates into over 1/2 billion for each legislator. The financing of the
total election from the general fund, even at high campaign spending
levels, would cost much less than 1/10 of 1%to stimulate the sensible
spending of the remaining 99.9% in the public interest.
Is this Really Necessary?: Testimony of Prof Robert C. Fellmeth, 11 CAL.
REG. L. REP. 19, 20 (1991).
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present vigorous challenges. 23 Until 1986, our law provided tax
credits for political contributions. The tax credit provision was repealed despite an all-out preservation effort led by the liberal Democratic Study Group working together with Representative Newt
Gingrich, because it was opposed by Chairman Dan Rostenkowskisufficient reason for sending him to jail. Tax credits could be graduated to encourage small contributors. In addition or instead of tax
credits, serious proposals have been made for some system of vouchers for all registered voters. Now that the Internet facilitates buying
everything imaginable, surely we can find ways to encourage broader
participation in contributing to candidates, parties and political
groups.
These various discoveries might be viewed as only spreading
and deepening cynicism. Discovery, however, brings its own joy,
and cynicism fades as we build greater understanding of the complexity of the challenge, the inescapable interrelationships of substantive law with the institutions that enforce and confront it, and the
relevant surrounding culture. 24 Any view of law that lacks such understanding will be too fragile to stand up to experience. Cynicism
is corrosive, skepticism is fruitful. Unduly rosy views and unduly
dark views are disabling. Appreciating the realities about the
hurdles and limits that face the application of law to politics is
the first step to finding ways to overcome those hurdles and
limits. 25 How many courses offer such opportunities for creativity?
23. See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSEN, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS (1996); LARRY MAKNSON, THE BIG PICTURE: MONEY FOLLOWS

POWER SHFT ON CAPITOL HILL (1997).
24. For the finest example of the importance of the surrounding "culture" to
how law is carried out, see ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY
WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 5-7 (1993) (describing the differences between a Northern Italy (Bologna) regional office and one in South-

ern Italy (Bar), both administering the same national statute).
25. The challenge facing campaign finance reform is what I call the current
American Dilemma, with apologies to Gunnar Myrdal. On the one hand, we
are committed to political equality, expressed most famously as "one person
one vote." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558-60 (1964). On the other hand
we are committed to a private enterprise economy. Although economic activity is subject to many forms of regulation, none of that regulation is aimed at
stopping the production of economic inequalities. It is Panglossian to believe
that campaign finance law can bridge the differences between political equality
and economic inequality.
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III. PROCESS

Although all students are taught Civil Procedure and most take
Criminal Procedure and Administrative Law, apparently the value of
process remains elusive. The value of process "sticks to the ribs"
when one encounters legislative procedures in which a legislature's
black members are excluded from the redistricting committees, or are
included but not told when there are meetings. N When all the minority party members are excluded,27 a debate about the value of
process includes surprising elements. Some students argue that fuller
process is useless because the majority will win anyway. Others argue that democracy comes down to the opportunity to debate differences openly in order to involve the public.?
Districting is a super-charged vehicle for examining how we
view procedure and the relative strengths and weaknesses of different institutions. First, should a court reviewing a districting plan take
into account the procedures by which it was adopted? Justices Powell and Stevens believed so.29 It is attractive to think of including
among the factors weighed in review of a districting that the plan
was the result of not ordinary legislating but instead of "railroading"
by the majority to keep its lock on power. However, when we compare why and how the Court broke into the malapportionment "lockup, 3° we find how much more problematic it would be for the federal courts to embark on reviewing legislatures' choice of procedures.
Second, even if the courts should not intervene to ensure fair,
democratic process in districting, should we revise state constitutions

26. See Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 330, 334 (E.D. La. 1983).
27. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). In Davis, the alleged

partisan gerrymandering had been accomplished by "vehicle bills"-ones
without content. See id. at 114 n.2. All members of the Conference Committee were from the majority party, although four minority party members were
"advisers" without votes. See id.
28. For a model of openness, see Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz,

Decision Making in the RedistrictingProcess: Approaching Fairness, 19 J.
LEGIS. 199, 202 (1993).

29. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 168, 175 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 759-61 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
30. See Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192-95 (1962).
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or legislative rules to assure openness by requiring, for example, supermajority passage? 31 Or should we make state courts directly responsible for redistricting if the ordinary legislative process does not
do the job in a timely fashion? Should we shift the process to a
commission rather than the legislature? A recent study of how
commission-enacted redistricting plans have fared in the 1990s suggests that such plans stand up in court better than plans produced by
the ordinary political process. 32 Bruce Cain, as experienced and wise
as anyone in these matters, argues powerfully for leaving districting
to the legislature, which "cannot... create the comforting facade of
agreement that a commission offers. It only promises a tolerant,
open way for a polity to resolve its disagreements... a considerable
achievement in itself.",33 Wherever one might come out on procedures for districting, one surely comes out more conscious of how
much procedure matters.
IV. FouR MORE STRENGTHS IN BRIEF

A. Relative InstitutionalCompetence, as Between Courtsand
Legislatures,and as Between Law andLaissez Faire
Districting is a good laboratory for this study, as just noted.
Another example is who should make the rules for political partiesthe national or the state legislatures, or the national or state parties?
One of the glories of our pluralism and federalism is the interesting
problems they generate. Consider the problem of Wisconsin's primary elections, which originated at the beginning of this century
34
with Wisconsin's legendary Governor "Fightin' Bob" LaFollette.

31. See Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the
Practitioner,Theorist, and Reformer, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND
THE COURTS 117, 139 (Bernard Grofinan ed., 1990).
32. See Jeffrey Kubin, The Casefor RedistrictingCommissions, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 837, 861-72 (1997).
33. BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 191 (1984); DAVID
BUTLER & BRUCE E. CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING (1992). "Many
academics reject outright the very notion of an objectively fair redistricting
process .... However valid their position may be, it must not be allowed to
deter the reformer." Kubin, supra note 32, at 839 n.10.

34. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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Two sacred features of Wisconsin primaries are that they are
"open"-anyone can vote in any party's primary-and that the
choice of the voters in presidential primaries binds the delegates to
the national convention. 5 When the Democratic National Committee decided that open primaries were producing results that embarrassed the national party, they promulgated a rule that either the primary could not be open or the delegates could not be bound by its
results. 36 The Supreme Court held that a national party's rule prevailed over both a state law and local party preference." The La
Follette case poses several acute questions. Who is the party: the
100 members of the national committee, 38 at least when it comes to
presidential matters, or the state party when it is their own state's
primary? What are the pluses and minuses of having the diversity of
state laws subject to override by whatever small national committee a
party chooses to have? Should a court decide such questions, or
should they be left to resolution by the political process-a federal
statute, or political ferment? Consider a view from an earlier generation:
[T]he character of American federalism cannot be separated
from the character of its political parties. These national
parties are locally based; their supreme aim is to capture the
Presidency; and to do this, given the electoral system with a
state's block of electoral votes counted as a unit, the great
prizes are the closely contested, populous industrial states,
where racial or other minority groups may hold the balance
of power. Not territorial representation but the federal
structure of American parties is the nexus39between federalism and the recognition of group interests.

35. See id.at 109-12.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 120-26.
38. Unlike the Democratic National Committee, the Republican National
Committee has almost no rule-making power, which is retained by the GOP's
quadrennial convention.
39. Paul Freund, FoundationsandDevelopment of.American Federalism,in
FEDERALISM AND THE NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA 160-62 (David P. Currie ed.
1964).
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B. Remedies
One of the most under-studied aspects of law, remedies are particularly worth attention in this course. The Voting Rights Act has
worked a revolution in districting where there are sufficiently large
and cohesive groups of minority voters. However, can nothing be
done to assure electoral opportunity for smaller groups like the
twenty-five percent of a district who may be I-Ispanic? Here we explore alternatives to America's "givens": geographic-based, singlemember districting. And once again, campaign finance is a remarkable vehicle for evaluating remedies. The most oft-considered tough
problem arises from the uniqueness of the electoral scene: it is not
the rare campaign in which the pressure to win overrides concern
about complying with campaign finance law---"so they'll call us
naughty and fine us, after we've won." Is it feasible to expect to set
and enforce fines so high that they do inhibit misconduct? Or to expect to be able to remove people from office?
Another rich problem of remedies is presented by the new Arizona and Massachusetts laws, adopted in 1998 by successful ballot
propositions.40 Each law provides that the agency granting public
funds to qualifying candidates, will increase the grants if a "nonparticipating" candidate exceeds the spending limits or, in Arizona, if
independent spending opposes a participating candidate or favors a
non-participating candidate. Let us assume that, around three weeks
before an election, a participating candidate applies for an additional
grant, claiming entitlement because of a triggering event. Will the
non-participating candidate--or independent spending group-have
a right to participate in the decision on whether the triggering event
did occur? Whatever the answer to that, will the agency's decision
be subject to judicial review? If there is any agency process and/or
judicial review, can the system operate in time? And if there is not
agency process or at least judicial review, does the system provide
due process?

40. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 16-905 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 55A §
11(1998).
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C. Advanced ConstitutionalLaw
Like courses in Church and Constitution, or Foreign Affairs and
the Constitution, Election Law enriches several slices from the Constitutional Law feast. The "advanced" work is mainly two-fold: to
broaden the focus from rights traditionally thought of as "individual"
to evaluate "group rights" and to broaden the focus from relationships between government and individual to include the institutions
of pluralism-parties and political groups. Several articles in this
symposium set forth so well the methods and value of, for example,
enriching law with political science. We Election Law fans and our
colleagues in, say, Church and Constitution, would benefit if Constitutional Law scholars would help us compare several types of "advanced" courses in our shared domain.
D. Empowering
The law that regulates politics, like much regulation 41 in fact
supports the "establishment"-the two major parties, incumbents,
and groups that enjoy substantial resources and organization. For
example, simply to get a candidate on the ballot requires knowledge
that is always available to major party candidates, but almost always
a serious hurdle for third parties, independents, and even challengers
in primaries. 42 Probably more than in any other law school course,
students who may want to challenge the establishment are empowered, and to that extent, our open democracy is strengthened.
Can we offer more than that?

41. As I indicated, I am old-fashioned enough to be more pro-regulation
than neutral, let alone anti-regulation. See supra note 15. I have scoffed at
those who believe that nothing works except unfettered markets and their own
analytic powers. See Roy A. Schotland, Overview: New Myths and Old Realities, in LAWRENCE G. GOLDBERG & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE
9 (1979).
42. See E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, VOTER CHOICE '96 (1996).
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